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1. A NEW ARGUMENT FOR DUTIES TO AID THE GLOBAL POOR
Globalization and Global Justice’s first chapter sketches a traditional 
autonomy-based argument for human rights, arguing, like others have 
done, that coercive institutions must ensure that their subjects secure food, 
water, and whatever else they need for sufficient autonomy. Unfortunately, 
this argument is not likely to convince skeptics about positive rights. So, 
the book provides a new argument for significant duties to the global poor. 
This symposium focuses on its most controversial claim: To be legitimate, 
coercive institutions must ensure their subjects secure sufficient autonomy 
to consent to their rule. I thank Charles Goodman, Peter Stone and Kok-
Chor Tan for this opportunity to sharpen this claim further in response to 
their insightful criticisms and the LEAP editors, particularly Paula Casal, for 
constructive observations throughout this exchange. 1
2. UNDERSTANDING LIBERTARIANISM: REPLY TO GOODMAN 
In his probing commentary, Charles Goodman denies my claim that 
libertarians must endorse actual consent theory. Goodman starts with an 
interesting question: “how, exactly, would the libertarian state use coercion 
against merely potentially autonomous citizens?” (Goodman 2014: 169). He 
wants to know what libertarian rights states violate if they do not ensure that 
people secure basic capacities. Goodman does not think libertarians must 
accept actual consent theory to avoid violating rights. 2
I believe that when states claim a monopoly on the exercise of coercive 
force within a traditionally defined territory without securing their rights-
respecting subjects’ consent, they violate individuals’ basic libertarian rights 
to protect their rights. Libertarians often talk about rights to person, property, 
1. I am also grateful to Marcus Arvan, Thom Brooks, and Darrel Moellendorf for helpful 
comments on this reply.
2. Libertarians’ reluctance to endorse any obligation to ensure that people secure basic 
capacities is part of what makes my argument interesting.
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and punishment. Nonetheless, I believe libertarians are also concerned with 
protection as they do not require individuals to punish rights violators. So 
states need justification to prohibit even potentially autonomous citizens 
from protecting their rights (or punishing others who pose a rights-violating 
threat to them). Libertarians should agree that these people must be able to 
consent (and must actually consent) to the state, otherwise it is illegitimate. 
States cannot take money to pay for protective services from rights-
respecting people who have not consented to give up their property. Taking 
money from them would violate their property rights. People may also prefer 
to maintain their right to protect their rights or hire others to do so. So those 
who would institute a state must ensure that potentially autonomous people 
secure the capacities they need to consent (and actually consent) before 
prohibiting these people from protecting their rights. Of course, in our world, 
states already exist. Still, to legitimately coerce people in the future (to exist 
as legitimate states) they must ensure that everyone secures what they need 
to consent (and secure consent). States do not take away individuals’ right 
to self-defense. They wrongly limit this right. They claim a monopoly on the 
exercise of coercive force. They specify which things count as self-defense 
and which do not. Without consent, libertarians should maintain that this 
violates the basic libertarian right to self-defense. 
Moreover, libertarians will reject Goodman’s claim that we do not wrong 
potentially autonomous people capable of punishing without violating 
rights by prohibiting them from doing so. Goodman misleadingly asserts 
that a potentially autonomous person with this capacity who is prohibited 
from exercising it “would be no more wronged than an unusually mature 
and responsible fifteen-year-old who is denied the right to drive a car” 
(Goodman 2014: 172). Libertarians believe these are both grievous wrongs.
As Goodman points out, some potentially autonomous people receive 
the help they need from their families, friends, or benefactors, but some do 
not. Even some of those with resources require help. They must consent to 
others using their resources even for this purpose. 3
Goodman wrongly suggests that the state can coerce potentially 
autonomous people for paternalistic reasons. If states can ensure their 
subjects secure the capacities they need to consent, the cost of doing so 
cannot justify riding rough-shod over basic libertarian rights. I allow that 
it may be acceptable to coerce people for their own benefit. Still, I doubt 
libertarians will take this line in general. We cannot take sleeping people’s 
money and give them some benefit when we can wake them. Even if it costs 
something to wake them and get their consent, we must do it. So I do not 
see how we can “conclude... that, in requiring those potentially autonomous 
3. It is not enough if people can, in some way, obtain the help they need (e.g. if they 
participate in the right way in markets), they must have the capacities they need for consent.
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beings on their territory who own valuable resources to contribute some of 
those resources to the defense of their society from violence, the libertarians 
would not wrong those beings” (Goodman 2014: 170). Libertarians may also 
deny that every person benefits from being a part of a state. 4
Goodman plausibly claims that, to punish others, people “need those 
faculties which Locke calls ‘calm reason and conscience’”, but some non-
autonomous people have these abilities (Goodman 2014: 171). Some who 
have these faculties cannot consent to a state. There are schizophrenics, for 
example, who can work, drive, and defend themselves and others, but are 
unable to engage in much political reasoning.
Finally, consider Goodman’s example of Annie —intended to show that 
even when someone does need help, it may be impermissible for private 
citizens in a libertarian state to provide it. In laying out the case, Goodman 
starts by asserting that:
almost all of the land in the libertarian society will be privately owned. 
The only exceptions would be facilities associated with the state’s 
legitimate protective role, such as police stations, courts, and military 
bases. It would not be difficult to justify refusing to let Annie stay in 
these facilities. If the society’s military bases and police stations were 
transformed into homeless shelters, those structures would no longer 
be able to carry out their rights-protective functions effectively. So 
libertarians would be on firm ground in claiming that, if Annie is going 
to live in the libertarian state, she’ll have to stay on private property 
(Goodman 2014: 174). 
So Goodman asks if it would be permissible:
for a property owner to allow Annie to stay on his land, but without 
providing her with what she needs in order to grow up and become 
autonomous? ... by giving Annie permission to stay on his land, the 
property owner in question is consenting to a situation whose moral result 
will be the existence of an obligation, binding on his fellow libertarian 
citizens, to provide Annie with resources. In allowing Annie to stay on his 
land ... the property owner is arguably violating their negative rights by 
imposing costs on them without their permission (Goodman 2014: 174).
4. That is, it is a live question why it would be in their interest to be a part of a large 
protective organization —some may prefer to be in small organizations. Incidentally, Nozick 
has to bring in considerations of consequences to justify depriving them of their right to do so. I 
believe the anarchists rightly object to this and say consent is required for consistent adherence 
to basic libertarian principles. The upshot of my argument is that consent leads to welfarism as 
opposed to anarchism.
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Consider a few reasons to worry about this case. First, this response relies 
upon some questionable empirical claims. If people would consent to any 
state at all, they might consent to giving a state more land than needed to 
secure some public goods —like national parks. Even if this is not the case, 
the libertarian state could expand to help people by purchasing land from 
citizens to create homeless shelters. Of course, the money to do so would 
presumably come from taxes. So this would be a kind of libertarian welfare 
state. This kind of taxation poses a threat to the coherence of libertarianism, 
but I am completely happy if my argument establishes that libertarianism is 
incoherent because it both requires and prohibits a welfare state. Moreover, 
“by giving Annie permission to stay on his land” the property owner may 
not be “consenting to a situation whose moral result will be the existence 
of an obligation” that amounts to violating negative rights of co-citizens 
(Goodman 2014: 174); many uses of property impose costs that do not 
violate libertarian rights. Goodman must offer more argument to make his 
case. That said, the idea that we must prohibit private property owners from 
doing what they want with their property would only provide reason to think 
that libertarians face another terrible dilemma, and that we should reject 
their view.
Goodman’s final proposal is most promising but also unsuccessful. He says 
that “it would be legitimate for the citizens of the libertarian state to make an 
agreement, perhaps at the constitutional convention that establishes their 
form of government, restricting the ability of landowners to harbor indigent 
potentially autonomous persons such as Annie” (Goodman 2014: 174). 5 If no 
one offers voluntary aid, Goodman says “Annie would [have to] effectively 
be expelled from the libertarian state” (Goodman 2014: 174-75). He takes 
this as an alternative to rejecting libertarianism. However, I take it that the 
distinction between libertarianism and anarchism hangs on whether or not 
states can maintain a monopoly on coercive force within a territory without 
having to cede land to the non-autonomous. Libertarians believe they can. 
Anarchists reject this conclusion. At least, Annie cannot be removed from 
land she owns within the libertarian state’s borders. People would also violate 
her basic libertarian rights if they forced her to sell her land or removed her 
from un-owned (state) land. If all of this land is necessary to protect negative 
rights, that poses yet another problem for libertarians and provides reason 
to reject their theory.
5. Not everyone in a libertarian state would be so uncharitable. 
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3. BEYOND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: REPLY TO STONE 
In his thought-provoking commentary, Peter Stone worries that many 
liberals will reject the claim that legitimate coercive institutions must ensure 
that their subjects secure sufficient autonomy. Stone thinks my argument 
relies on an ambiguous idea of consent. Moreover, he says some liberals deny 
“‘that people have a right to dissent from the rule of coercive institutions by 
conscientious objection, non-violent protest, passive resistance, and so forth’ 
(Stone 2014: 185).” Stone notes, for instance, that “the democratic theorist 
and the hypothetical consent theorist ... have very different things in mind 
when they identify political systems as consensual, even if both endorse 
democratic institutions” (Stone 2014: 187). For the “hypothetical consent 
theorist, it would not be the democratic rights that form the critical locus of 
consent. It would be the hypothetical consent itself” (Stone 2014: 186-87).
My argument does not rely on an ambiguous idea of consent. Pace 
Stone (2014: 177), I do not claim people must actually consent to coercive 
institutions’ rules. Contrary to what stone claims, I believe that people must 
have the capacities to consent. I give a detailed account of these capacities 
on which everyone must be able to do at least some (instrumental) reasoning 
and planning. I then derive the premise that legitimate coercive institutions 
must ensure their subjects secure sufficient autonomy to consent from 
several contractualist (and non-contractualist) theories. I argue that on 
plausible hypothetical, democratic, and actual consent theories, legitimate 
coercive institutions must ensure that their subjects secure these capacities. 
I believe we should reject theories on which rulers legitimately coerce 
people who lack basic freedoms under their rule. We should, for instance, 
reject hypothetical consent theories on which people cannot even object 
to coercive rule (Stone 2014: 187). We cannot justify existing coercive 
institutions by appeal to the idea that people “could conceivably consent to 
arrangements without democratic rights” (Stone 2014: 187). People should 
at least be able to maintain basic freedoms under coercive rule. Similarly, we 
should reject any account of democracy that does not involve a constitution, 
or some other means of protecting basic capacities. Such views fail to 
respect individual freedom. This does not beg the question against them. It 
provides reason to reject implausible versions of the views once we see their 
shortcomings clearly.
Stone, rightly, notes that my argument can be expanded. After explaining 
the general argumentative strategy, I take libertarianism to be the stalking 
horse for liberalism. I do not engage with the details of every, or even a wide 
range of, communitarian, democratic or hypothetical consent theories. 
However, I devote a whole chapter to arguing that on actual consent theory, 
and libertarianism, legitimate coercive institutions must ensure their subjects 
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secure sufficient autonomy. Moreover, even some of those I do not address 
—including some consequentialists— might accept this conclusion. 6
Both Stone and Kok-Chor Tan worry, however, that libertarians will reject 
the idea that consent requires any basic capacities. As Stone puts it, “many 
libertarians are very attracted to the idea that consent authorizes practically 
anything. If someone wants to consent to slavery, then so be it” (Stone 2014: 
185). Tan also worries that, on libertarianism, people need not have sufficient 
autonomy to consent to coercion (Tan 2014: 200). Moreover, Stone points 
out that actual consent theorists and “libertarians are usually lukewarm at 
best about democratic rights” (Stone 2014: 185). He says that “if people grant 
consent to arrangements with such rights, fine, but they could just as easily 
consent to some other arrangement... Indeed, the entire idea of a “right to 
dissent” must seem strange to an actual consent theorist” (Stone 2014: 186).
Even if libertarians maintain that people can consent into slavery, they 
should not deny that free consent requires basic capacities. At least, people 
should be able to object to coercive rule until, and unless, they give up their 
right to do so. The severely mentally disabled, young children, the comatose, 
and those deluded by hunger cannot enter into free contracts. For contracts 
to be free, people must be able to consent. Libertarians defend slavery 
because they want to ensure the fidelity of free contracts. 7 Still, people need 
basic capacities to enter into free contracts.
4. BASIC RIGHTS: REPLY TO TAN
In his helpful essay, Tan worries that my argument is circular, starting from 
an “‘autonomy-based’ human right to food, water and other means of 
subsistence” (Tan 2014: 207). 8 He suggests this undermines the strand of my 
argument addressed to libertarians, in particular. Libertarians notoriously 
deny a right to autonomy exists. 
My argument does not start by assuming a right to autonomy. Rather, I 
address liberals who believe that people must maintain a basic minimum of 
6. Philosophers like John Stuart Mill endorse basic rights, e.g. to freedom, even if they 
offer an indirect or instrumental justification for them that appeals to consequentialist 
considerations (Mill 1983, Ch. 5). My argument rules out views that ride rough-shod over 
individuals’ rights and allow that it is normally acceptable to coerce some people just for 
others’ benefit. My argument will address consequentialists, and others who reject natural 
rights, as long as they agree that it is generally necessary to justify coercion to the coerced 
and this justification requires that people at least have the capacities they need to object, or 
consent, to coercive rule.
7. Stone is right that “those deeply concerned with rights of democratic participation (like 
most egalitarian liberals) have little use for actual consent” (Stone 2014: 186).
8. If that were the case, Kok-Chor Tan would be right to object that since “there is an 
autonomy-based human right to subsistence, it is not clear why the presence of coercive 
institutions is ... a necessary condition of the duty to provide subsistence” (Tan 2014: 198). 
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freedom under legitimate coercive rule. 9 The key idea is that people should 
be free to shape their relationships with their coercive institutions. 10 Different 
liberals understand this freedom in different ways but, I argue that, on plausible 
liberal theories, it entails a commitment to sufficient autonomy. Although 
people might not be able to do without coercive institutions, they should at 
least get to decide for themselves how to react to their subjection. 11 People 
should at least be able to object, or consent, to coercive rule. If people require 
assistance to secure the requisite autonomy, and no other agent or institution 
provides it, their coercive institutions must do so, on pain of illegitimacy. 
It is easiest to see how my argument against libertarians does not 
presuppose a right to autonomy. Libertarians believe people have basic 
rights to person, property, and to self-defense. 12 I argue that libertarians must 
endorse actual consent theory because coercion constrains an individual’s 
exercise of these basic libertarian rights. Roughly, if rulers claim a monopoly 
on coercive force over all of their rights-respecting subjects within a 
traditionally defined territory without securing their consent, they violate 
people’s rights to protect themselves. 13 At least rights-respecting potentially 
autonomous people must consent to such coercive rules. To actually consent 
to coercive rules, people must be able to consent. 14 Moreover, this requires 
sufficient autonomy (the ability to reason and plan). So, if no one provides 
these people with the assistance they need, even libertarians should agree 
that their coercive institutions must do so. 15
Tan rightly suggests that my argument provides the missing premise in 
an argument for egalitarian duties. I argue that many coercive international 
institutions exist. So, if coercion grounds egalitarian duties, like Michael 
9. Coercion threatens to violate individual’s basic freedom (as well as their equality and 
autonomy). It does not always undermine freedom, equality, autonomy, or harm people, but it 
is certainly capable of doing so.
10. I take it we should respect everyone, free or not; people should be able to shape their 
relationships with their coercive institutions. 
11. Hassoun 2012: 58.
12. Although I am not convinced people have such inviolable rights, in addressing the 
libertarian, I consider what follows from this claim. One might worry that in attempting to 
address all liberals, the book does not adequately address any of them, but doing so fully would 
have been exhausting. So the book focused on providing a detailed look at how the argument 
might go in the hard case of the libertarian and on illustrating the general argumentative 
approach. I hope that it provides fertile ground for future inquiry. Whether or not one sees the 
book as offering a unified argument or several distinct arguments will depend on whether one 
looks only at the major premises of the argument or at its sub-premises.
13. GGJ does not address anarchists who think that states can simply cede territory to rights-
respecting people who do not consent to their rule nor those who claim international institutions’ 
coercion can be justified without ensuring that all of their subjects secure sufficient autonomy.
14. On the view that libertarians are committed to requiring actual consent, see, e.g., 
Simmons 1999 and Long and Machan 2008.
15. On some liberal views, autonomy is constitutive of the basic freedom at issue, but my 
argument does not rely on this being the case. 
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Blake, for example, maintains, there are international egalitarian duties. 16 
I also agree with Tan that people might not have the capacity to consent 
to, or reject, coercive offers in situations of extreme inequality. 17 None of 
this, however, undermines my response to the libertarian. Moreover, pace 
Tan, I do not endorse skeptics’ attempts to raise “the justificatory bar for 
global justice ...[or] duties of humanitarian assistance” (Tan 2014: 199) by 
recognizing their existence and taking the time to see where their arguments 
go astray. Rather, I try to extend the consensus on these important duties.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Let me recap. First, pace Goodman, libertarians hold that if we prohibit 
people from protecting their rights without consent, we wrong those capable 
of protecting their rights without violating others’ rights. People can only be 
deprived of the right to protect their rights with consent. Most libertarians 
do not believe we can coerce such people for paternalistic reasons. Rulers 
cannot rightly expel these people from, at least their own, privately held 
property. If we must prohibit private land owners from letting non-
autonomous people onto their land, that only worsens the dilemma at the 
heart of libertarianism. It provides further reason to reject the view. Second, 
pace Stone, my argument does not rely upon an ambiguous understanding 
of consent. I argue that, whatever account of consent contractualists 
endorse, they should agree that legitimate coercive rule requires that people 
have basic capacities to consent. Moreover, my argument addresses many 
non-contractualists, including some consequentialists. Third, pace Tan 
and Stone, even if libertarians believe that people can freely consent to 
whatever contracts they like, they should agree that people need some basic 
reasoning and planning capacities to enter into free contracts. Finally, pace 
Tan, my argument is not circular. The idea of freedom from which it starts 
does not presuppose, but grounds a right to, autonomy. Libertarians, for 
instance, hold that people only have basic rights to person, property, and 
punishment. I argue that coercion, in constraining the exercise of these basic 
rights, requires justification. On libertarianism, I suggest, states must secure 
consent to avoid violating rights and people require sufficient autonomy to 
consent. Tan and Stone are right, however, that it is possible to extend my 
argument in many ways. It may even ground global egalitarian obligations. 
Much room remains for future research.
16. I do not, however, endorse Blake’s view.
17. Elsewhere (e.g. Hassoun 2013) I defend much more robust obligations to aid people 
above this threshold than in the book.
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